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This paper examines the impact of state intervention in French-German inter-firm linkages and discusses the 
implications of conflicting national interests for the furthering of single market integration. It demonstrates that 
despite initial success in launching large-scale cross-border alliances in strategic sectors, France and Germany 
have remained divided by their own industrial nationalism. It argues that their respective attitudes towards 
industrial policy are less contradictory than would appear at first sight, but that transcending industrial 
nationalism by Europeanising the notion of economic patriotism would be an essential pre-condition for a more 
efficient EU-wide industrial policy within a better integrated internal market.  
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Introduction   
Industrial cooperation between France and Germany has frequently drawn media attention, 
sometimes claiming ambitious achievements, sometimes highlighting shortcomings or hidden 
inter-state rivalries. Numerous inter-firm linkages have been established across the Rhine, 
particularly in the past two decades, some of which were politically enforced. State-led 
industrial co-operation between the two countries has led to corporate successes, most of 
whom have been eroded by industrial nationalism, often leading to striking failures. This 
empirical study examines Franco-German cross-border linkages, and focuses on cases where 
state interference has been instrumental in implementing these linkages.  
 
Several reasons justify the need to explore state-led inter-firm linkages in the specific context 
of Franco-German industrial co-operation. First, the French and the German economies 
correspond to two varieties of capitalism (VoC) sharing important features, but distinct in 
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terms of the role that the state plays, or attempts to play, in the economy. French industry 
tends to be state-directed, whereas industrial developments in Germany tend to be state-
enabled (Schmidt 2002). This raises crucial questions as to how the two sides’ diverging 
interpretations of what industrial policy entails, and how their respective institutional 
structures and modes of government-industry relations impact upon the principle of grouping 
together firms and sectors from the two countries. Second, France and Germany, who both 
pledge to have established a unique relationship at the forefront of European construction, 
have reached a high level of economic and political interdependence which, at first glance, 
appears to make them well suited for facilitating or implementing cross-border linkages 
between their home firms. They are indeed bound together by a tightly woven web of trade 
and investment relations which increases macroeconomic interdependence (despite lack of 
fiscal and macro-economic convergence) between their national economies. Moreover, they 
have been each other’s main supplier and purchaser of goods and services year after year 
(despite persistent imbalance in their inter-trade relationships) as well as one of the other’s 
main investors, reflecting a high level of industrial intertwinement
1
. Third, the fact that these 
two countries are the biggest Eurozone economies, which have kept the largest 
manufacturing base in Europe, adds to this study’s relevance.  
 
Industrial relations between France and Germany are indeed a relevant aspect of European 
economic integration (Artus 2009). The declared aim of these relations has been to promote 
European champions in areas where comparative advantages could benefit from being 
combined with critical mass. However, this research highlights the discrepancy between 
declared aims and real outcomes, rhetoric and reality. Frequently hampered by inter-state 
rivalries, bilateral industrial co-operation has proved to be the most difficult field of 
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intergovernmental co-operation (Cromme 2005, Uterwedde 2009). This ambivalence between 
co-operation and rivalry raises important issues, both in terms of furthering European 
integration and from a business perspective, with respect to state interference in cross-
national inter-firm linkages, the desirability of enforcing these linkages by means of political 
intervention, and more generally the role of the state in promoting, or preventing, steps 
towards Europeanising national industries. Assessing the efficiency of French-German co-
operation in this area provides useful indications about limitations to potential systemic 
convergence, for instance when it comes to merging technologies, harmonising production 
processes, combining talents, sharing ownership or agreeing on new managerial structures in 
an equitable way. Hence, Franco-German industrial conflicts emphasize the discrepancy 
between declared partnership and underlying rivalry as well as national obstacles to European 
integration. The quality of bilateral industrial co-operation, and more generally the way that 
states interact with each other and with business to create different forms of economic co-
operation, can serve as a test bench with regard to furthering industrial integration within the 
Single Market. 
 
Since the Single Market was launched, numerous attempts have been made by EU member-
states to prevent, on nationality grounds, companies from other parts of Europe from taking 
over their industrial flagships. Restrictive national measures to limit ownership transfer 
through cross-border corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) raise legal issues since they 
contravene fundamental internal market principles on free capital movement and the right of 
establishment. They also raise crucial economic issues since the European economy can only 
prosper by removing barriers within an open competitive Single Market rather than erecting 
new obstacles between member states. What are the implications of conflicting national 
interests for the EU’s efforts to consolidate the Single Market and generate a ‘corporate 
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Europe’? At a time when re-launching the Single Market is on the EU’s agenda (Monti 2010; 
COM 2010), and in a backdrop of rising economic nationalism, there is a need to re-appraise 
the impact of political activism in attempting to build or consolidate industrial champions in 
Europe. Issues such as ‘champion-building’ (Hayward 1995, Seabright 2005, Mosconi 2006), 
economic patriotism (Landier and Thesmar 2005, Wruuck 2006) or the nationality of 
companies (Levet 2000, Véron 2006) are frequently at the heart of academic and policy 
debates on internal market integration and the future of European industry. Divergences 
about what industrial policy should entail is a recurrent source of conflicts between Brussels 
and member-states as well as between Berlin and Paris (Trouille 2007). The present paper 
proposes the following roadmap. First, it highlights the role of state intervention as a 
distinctive feature that differentiates the French from the German VoC, stresses its 
importance in cross-border linkages regarded as ‘strategic’, and investigates modes of state 
involvement corresponding to different French and German conceptions of industrial policy. 
There is indeed a fundamental difference in the way that government-industry relations are 
organised in France and in Germany. This difference, which is at the source of conflicts in 
intergovernmental cooperation, concerns the respective influence of the state in the French 
and the German institutional structures and corporate cultures. The VoC perspective (Hall 
and Soskice 2001, Hancké et al. 2007) provides a useful theoretical framework to assess the 
role played by the state in distinct national patterns of market co-ordination and to explain the 
variance between French and German state intervention and industrial policies. Second, this 
paper empirically analyses emblematic cases of state-induced Franco-German corporate 
alliances. For this purpose, extensive data was collected about all state-influenced groupings 
of French and German firms in order to examine whether failed or aborted state-led linkages 
are business-inherent, or whether failures may have been caused by unco-operative or 
obstructive state interference. Finally the paper draws conclusions on the conditions that 
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these two distinct approaches of industrial policy would need to fulfil for successfully 
promoting cross-national inter-firm linkages in Europe.  
 
 
Co-ordination or Intervention: Industrial Policy, the State and the VoC Perspective  
Issues of public intervention and interventionist policy-making have been widely covered by 
Environment and Planning C (Atherton 2006, Bennett 2008), sometimes with a focus on 
France or Germany (Sternberg et al 2010, Menu 2012). Existing literature on various modes 
of market entry focusing on French and German firms tends to concentrate on comparing 
their expansion strategies. This literature provides primarily comparative analysis of their 
respective domestic and cross-border (European and transatlantic) operations or looks into 
the influence of these companies’ national origins on their alliance strategies (Urban et al. 
2000, Mayrhofer 2001, 2004), but does not specifically address state interference in inter-
firm linkages. This analysis of state-led Franco-German inter-firm linkages aims to 
demonstrate on the basis of empirical evidence the systematic impact of diverging 
conceptions of the role of the state within the institutional organisations of national 
economies on inter-state industrial co-operation. The VoC school of analysis provides a 
pertinent framework to sustain this theoretical claim and explain the variance between French 
and German state intervention and industrial policies. Distinct patterns of state co-ordination 
or intervention resulting from these diverging conceptions correspond, indeed, to different 
varieties of capitalism, and these differences are replicated in different understandings and 
national industrial policy practices.  
 
The VoC literature identifies various forms of economies, ranging from two ‘ideal-type’ 
models of capitalism, referred to as ‘liberal’ and ‘co-ordinated’ market economies (LMEs and 
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CMEs), to  ‘mixed-market’ and ‘emerging market’ economies (MMEs and EMEs). Based on 
this typology, Hancké et al. (2007) make up for the relative absence of the role of the state in 
Hall and Soskice’s initial iteration of VoC theory formulation (2001) and explore several 
dimensions of the role played by the state in shaping and co-ordinating various types of 
contemporary capitalism. Whilst the role played by the state in an economy is only one 
parameter amongst others in order to identify and contrast VoCs, we believe that it is an 
important one. In every modern economy, relations between the state and the supply-side of 
the economy are indeed a relevant determining variable, but these relations take different 
forms according to the type of capitalism concerned. Different degrees of state involvement 
can be observed, and still persist today, in various modern economies. In some ‘state-
influenced’ market economies (SMEs) like China, Russia and pre-1990 France, an activist 
state owns large sectors, controls industrial credit and maintains close direct influence over 
the economy, as a central actor in economic and industrial policy-making, providing both a 
framework for business activities and a means of pursuing them. In other economies 
(Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries), the state is one element of co-ordination 
among others which acts primarily as a regulator operating at arm’s length. Rather than being 
a direct promoter of economic activity, it acts as a compensator in co-ordinating deficits and 
structural change and as a provider of economic consensus. In still other economies 
corresponding to the liberal Anglo-Saxon model, the state has traditionally allowed markets 
to operate within a broad set of regulatory frameworks, refraining from direct interference.  
 
However, such differences are not always as clear-cut as they used to be. Traditional 
capitalist models in Europe have undergone deep transformations through a combination of 
economic pressures resulting from globalisation and pressures for policy convergence 
emanating from Europe (Callaghan 2008). This certainly applies to France and Germany. 
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Whilst the German model is widely regarded among scholars as a CME, some also classify 
France as a CME, others as an MME, or as an SME. Schmidt (2002) argues that nationally 
based varieties continue to predominate and develops her own typology of capitalist models 
in Europe, separating ‘state capitalism’ (French statism) from ‘managed capitalism’ (German 
corporatism) and ‘market capitalism’ (British liberalism). Schmidt (2003, 2008, 2009) insists 
that despite having evolved in a market-oriented direction, transformed French capitalism still 
constitutes a specific variety where an ‘interventionist’ state organises inter-firm 
collaboration and imposes management-labour co-operation. Uterwedde (2009) 
acknowledges these fundamental differences between the French and German models, one 
characterised by a dirigist state leading post-war modernisation, the other by ordoliberalism 
and the social component of its market economy, but also highlights similarities and elements 
of convergence between two continental European models distinct from the Anglo-Saxon 
LME type. Monti (2010), in his recent reflexion on re-vitalising the Single Market by 
proposing a suitable compromise between concerns of Anglo-Saxon free market economies 
and of continental social market economies, ranks both the French and German VoCs in the 
second category.  
 
In this paradigm, it is necessary to understand the changing role of the state from pre- to post-
1990 France. During the Trente glorieuses
2
, the state played a paramount role in defining, 
supporting and organising the post-war growth model. Economic modernisation was a top-
down process orchestrated through active state intervention. Modernisation strategies relied 
upon major industrial projects
3
 initiated by the state in the framework of a large public sector 
encompassing banking and finance, and aimed at shaping ‘national champions’ with state-
influenced mergers (Cohen 1992, Maclean 2002, Gaudard 2005). But the 1970s’ economic 
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 Nuclear energy, transport infrastructures, aeronautics, defence and space technologies, high-speed trains, 
information and communication technologies. 
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crises marked a retreat from state intervention throughout Europe. From the mid-1980s, with 
economic liberalisation and the run-up towards the Single Market, the state exerted pressure 
from below, subjecting firms to increasing market competition (Hancké et al. 2007:55). 
Significant pillars of dirigisme were dismantled by successive governments, ‘albeit without 
forsaking all of its rhetoric’, as Hall (Hancké et al. 2007:63) notes. A rapid transformation of 
French capitalism took place, which was described as ‘a revolution (…) changing the whole 
economic and social framework of the country, the way of working as much as the conditions 
of redistribution or the social dialogue’ (Izraelevicz 1999:279). Today’s French economy has 
a high degree of openness in trade, foreign investment, and in the capital structure of its large 
firms: the share of foreign investors in the capital of French firms has become one of the 
highest in modern economies
4
. Dirigisme gradually gave way to a reduced state, more 
openness, a wider acceptance of privatisations and less hostility towards market deregulation. 
Policy-makers endeavoured to adjust to this new context, without upsetting an electorate 
expecting the state to act as a bulwark against negative social consequences of economic 
globalisation. This led to a pragmatic combination between traditionalism and modernism, a 
shift from Keynesianism to more ‘horizontal’ supply-side policies aiming to shape a 
business-friendly environment, and less direct intervention (Trouille and Uterwedde 2008; 
2013). The compétitivité globale
5
 approach (Colletis et al. 2001) reshaped public 
interventionism, with the state becoming gradually a partner in a system of multiple private 
and public actors, in which ‘soft’ competitiveness factors such as innovation, knowledge, and 
co-operation became more prominent in public policies (Colletis and Levet 1997). This 
policy adjustment to enable the French economy to keep up with international competition 
was nonetheless coupled with efforts to retain a sizeable public steering capacity as a 
compromise between passive adaptation and illusory national resistance to globalisation. 
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Later, the Sarkozy era marked an apparent return to more interventionist supply-side policies 
as a means of asserting France’s position as a strong industrial nation on the world stage, in 
particular through pro-active strategies to promote national champions. Priority given to 
national considerations intensified to become a leitmotiv of Sarkozy’s ethnocentric attitude 
towards industrial policy, generating serious conflicts (takeover, endorsed by the French 
political establishment, of Franco-German pharmaceutical group Aventis by a smaller French 
company (see Appendix table T1-case A11); re-capitalisation of engineering group Alstom to 
prevent Siemens from stepping in (T3-C7); national rivalries within EADS
6
 (T1-A1)) and 
paving the way towards French state-controlled ‘world champions’ brandishing the national 
flagship in the energy (GDF
7
-Suez) and nuclear sectors (Areva: T3-C2) to the detriment of 
German competitors (Eon) and partners (Siemens) alike. However, today’s economic impact 
of the French state no longer compares with its omnipotence in post-war times. Complying 
with EU regulations adds constraints which contain temptations to revert to old-type sectoral 
industrial policies. This ambivalent stance between traditional and pragmatic attitudes 
explains scholars’ dilemma when attempting to classify the French VoC as an MME, a CME 
or as separate SME entity.  
 
Unlike the dirigist model of pre-1990 France, the managed, co-ordinated German capitalism 
unequivocally referred as early as 1948 to liberal economic values and market openness. 
Economic liberalism, initially epitomised by Erhard’s concept of soziale Marktwirtschaft8, 
has been dominant throughout the post-war period. But in practice it combined its liberal 
framework with a dense network of corporatist regulations worked out by labour and 
industrial organisations, and active local and regional forms of public intervention.  Despite a 
high degree of openness in trade and investment, Rhineland capitalism has been characterised 
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 European Aeronautics, Defence and Space Company. 
7
 Gaz de France. 
8
 Social Market Economy. 
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by a national capital structure and collective attitudes making friendly or unfriendly takeovers 
of German firms by foreign groups more difficult (Streeck 1996). Under the combined effect 
of German unification and European integration, the German political economy has also had 
to respond to considerable adaptational pressures (Dyson and Goetz 2003). Characterised by 
its consensus-oriented mechanisms of industrial and social relations facilitated by an 
‘enabling’ state, the German CME was able to rely on the co-operative management of 
economic change and domestic policy adaptation. It addressed pressures for change by 
reconfiguring its institutional arrangements to introduce more flexibility into its model whilst 
trying not to alter its main characteristics.  
 
Pressures for change have therefore not fundamentally altered a German approach to 
industrial policy which has, traditionally, been implicit and less noticeable than in France 
(Uterwedde 2009). Whereas state intervention in French industry is perceived as natural and 
legitimate, its scope is much more limited in Germany, where the state has neither the same 
legitimacy nor similar policy instruments at its disposal. Until the early 2000s, for reasons 
inherent to post-war economic, political and social culture, the concept of industrial policy 
was virtually absent from official discourse. Painful recollections of the centralised war 
economy, coupled with a rejection of the former East-German command economy model, 
shaped its ‘horizontal’ dimension within the framework of the social market economy (Levet 
2005), in which the state’s role consists primarily of developing a regulatory framework 
(Ordnungspolitik) to ensure equilibrium between market and social justice. This implies that 
public action remains by nature decentralised in a context where the state is only one partner 
out of a wide range of actors, in particular the 16 region-states (Länder), the local councils 
(Stadtwerke), which contribute actively to implementing regional strategies of economic and 
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industrial development, and professional organisations (Verbände), which frequently act as 
intermediaries of public regulation across various sectors.  
 
However, German attitudes towards industrial policy have arguably been more ambiguous 
than French ones. Germany has frequently resorted to measures resembling French public 
interventions to avoid losing national control of home companies. In the old-type 
Deutschland AG
9
, collective attitudes and cross-ownerships between banks, insurance groups 
and industry have traditionally sheltered domestic firms from foreign takeovers (Streek 
1996). Endeavours to preserve Lower Saxony’s role as a major shareholder of the 
Volkswagen group, attempts to prevent the French EDF
10
 from becoming majority 
shareholder in the electricity group EnBW
11
 (T3-C5), or support (against the ruling of the 
Federal Cartel Office) for Eon’s takeover of Ruhrgas to create a German champion, are only 
some of a long list of public interventions to ensure that domestic firms remain under German 
control. Of course, such attempts were primarily motivated by electoral considerations rather 
than an interventionist industrial policy per se. They have been more limited than in France 
and do not fundamentally question Germany’s pro-market stance, but indicate nonetheless 
that Germany is, in practice, not as liberal as it claims to be (Uterwedde 2009). This 
dichotomy between the French intervening state and the German enabling state, and the way 
it is reflected in their respective approach to industrial policy, has led to fundamental 
misunderstandings, with Germany reproaching its neighbour’s ‘dirigist’, ‘colbertist’ attitude, 
whilst France was criticising what was perceived as an inconsistent, even hypocritical 
German attitude. These crucial differences and misunderstandings frequently affect 
intergovernmental co-operation and also hamper bilateral policy action at EU level.  
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Classifying Inter-firm Linkages 
 
In the light of diverging industrial policy conceptions rooted in the respective economic 
traditions of the French state directed and the German state induced VoC, we now need to 
examine how the respective intervening or enabling role played by the state in these two 
continental economic models impacts upon state-induced Franco-German corporate alliances. 
To do this, this paper investigates the most emblematic cases of cross-border linkages 
between German and French companies in which at least one of the two states concerned has 
been involved, either as a shareholder, or as a pro-active actor aiming to lead or influence the 
shaping of such groupings. The research examines a record of all inter-firm linkages 
established between French and German companies across public and private sectors which 
have been influenced by state intervention in the last 30 years. Secondary data was collected 
from a combination of sources ranging from official French and German registers of 
enterprises
12
 to various official reports, the French and German economic press, library 
archives and companies’ websites in order to draw the most accurate database as well as 
specific information in each case with regard to government intervention. 35 cases were 
identified and classified into four distinct categories (see appendices). Whilst many cases are 
firm-specific, some are sector-specific and therefore comprise several linkages. Indeed, in 
some cases like the creation of EADS (T1-A1), the merger was in effect the consolidation of 
numerous pre-existing industrial partnerships
13
 in which French, German and sometimes 
other European companies were involved. 
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Table 1 groups together 14 cases of M&As involving French and German firms conducted 
with direct or indirect state intervention. Table 2 comprises 5 cases of state-led joint ventures 
(JV) between French and German firms. Table 3 lists up 8 cases of failed state-led attempts to 
initiate strategic alliances (mergers, JVs), including co-operative alliances ending abruptly or 
measures taken by France or Germany to prevent a company from the partner country from 
taking control of a domestic company. Finally, Table 4 details 9 cases of major state-led joint 
research and development (R&D) projects involving firms, research institutions and 
laboratories from both countries. This classification into four categories allows, firstly, to 
enhance visibility over various types of state-induced Franco-German inter-firm linkages and 
the sectors concerned, and to assess which forms of bilateral co-operation are the most 
frequent. Secondly, analysing this new empirical evidence provides useful insights into the 
real extent of state-led attempts to promote politically constructed linkages. Thirdly, the 
database serves as a support in distinguishing alliances where companies concerned or sector 
consolidation appear to have benefited from state involvement from linkages hampered by 
inter-state rivalries. Finally, it allows us to evaluate whether a willingness to co-operate pro-
actively in grouping together companies can, in itself, overcome deeply-rooted diverging 
conceptions of the role played by states in shaping industrial policies.  
 
Certain types of inter-firm linkages, i.e. M&As, JVs, capital participations and co-operative 
R&D projects provide an appropriate focus for this research, as they reflect strategic 
alliances, whereas other forms of more commercially based contractual arrangements 
(licensing, franchising) have been left aside. Greenfield investments carried out by French or 
German enterprises to set up a subsidiary in the neighbouring country have also been left 
aside since they do not correspond to the definition of an inter-firm linkage, i.e. a contractual 
(co-operative or control-based) agreement between two firms (Urban et al. 2000). Only one 
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major greenfield investment in 1991 in East Germany (T1-A2) is included in the study since 
it was negotiated at the highest political level and generated linkages between several major 
French and German firms. One problem encountered in the classification process was to 
assess whether state influence was direct or underlying. Indeed, the presence of public shares 
in a company’s capital does not preclude that a state dictated an acquisition or a capital 
participation in the neighbouring country, nor does it indicate that a state was pro-active in 
launching a JV. Moreover, whilst state control does not necessarily imply state-led 
intervention, state intervention can also take place when a company is neither state-owned, 
nor state-controlled through capital participation, golden shares or votes. Furthermore, for 
several acquisitions listed in Table 1, there is some uncertainty as to whether direct state 
intervention actually took place. The mere presence of the state in the capital of some 
companies will, for instance, be a factor influencing strategic decisions in a sense that 
accommodates this sometimes cumbersome shareholder. However, in most cases, either the 
French or the German state (most frequently the first, more episodically the second), or in 
some cases both, have played a determining role, either by facilitating, encouraging or 
pushing an M&A operation, the launch of a JV, a capital participation, a joint R&D project, 
or simply by blocking a co-operative alliance, hence preventing potential sector consolidation 
or strategic business choices.  
 
A first examination of the four tables provides useful indications as to which forms of state-
influenced Franco-German inter-firm linkages tend to be most frequent. Table 1 presents the 
largest number of linkages across the Rhine, which are overwhelmingly acquisitions
14
. Table 
2 only comprises a limited number of JVs. This indicates that JVs, which suppose that control 
is shared, are not the preferred means of linking French and German firms together. JVs 
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ending in a divorce are compiled in table 3. For instance, Areva and Siemens’ former nuclear 
alliance appears in table 3 (T3/C2), which provides interesting insights into government 
failures in attempting to push through Franco-German corporate alliances, and into political 
attempts to prevent deals. Finally, table 4 highlights more recent attempts to boost joint R&D 
projects between French and German companies and research centres.  
 
 
The most emblematic linkages 
 
A number of observations can be drawn from these tables. The database provides useful 
insights into French and German state presence in acquisitions, state involvement in public 
utilities, state influence on private sector companies, and more generally into inter-state 
rivalry. Nearer investigation into the most emblematic cases reveals that the difficulties 
experienced in state-led Franco-German linkages are more frequently caused by industrial 
nationalism than business-related.  
 
In an acquisition, a dominant firm absorbs a weaker firm, whilst in a JV firms are more equal 
partners. In a merger, there is usually a dominant partner, whilst ‘mergers of equals’ are rare. 
Only one substantial Franco-German merger materialised in 1999 (T1-A1), which brought 
together, under the aegis of EADS, a number of already existing strategic alliances in 
aeronautics (Aérospatiale and Deutsche Airbus), defence (Aérospatiale-Matra and Dasa, 
Eurocopter) and space (Astrium and Ariane). The fact that state-led Franco-German inter-
firm linkages count more acquisitions than mergers or JVs is a clear indication of the 
difficulties to share power, which shows that the issue of control is politically sensitive in 
bilateral industrial co-operations. Sectors concerned by acquisitions are primarily banking, 
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insurance, consultancy, engineering, postal services, and energy utilities, to which we need to 
add the Leuna oil refinery greenfield investment and the linked acquisition of the Minol 
petrol station network (T1-A2). In many cases (particularly T1-A1/2/11/14), political 
involvement was a determining factor leading to the acquisition. In some, French state 
presence in the capital of the ‘predator’ has exerted indirect political pressure on strategic 
choices (T1-A3/4/5/6/7/8/9/11/14).  In a few remaining cases, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether state presence in the capital of one of the businesses involved played an indirect role 
in the acquisition. These cross-border acquisitions show nonetheless a substantial imbalance 
between French and German state presence, with much more frequent incidence of 
acquisitions of German firms by state-owned French companies, and only two records of 
acquisitions where the dominant partner is a state-owned German company, Deutsche Post 
(T1-A12), or a former German public utility with still a minority public stake, Deutsche 
Telekom (T1-A13). There is, however, no conclusive evidence that either of these 
acquisitions in France were the outcome of German political interference. The acquisition by 
German energy provider Eon of EDF’s equity interest in Graninge (T1-A10), which allowed 
EDF to pursue the rationalisation of its foreign operations and Eon to become majority 
shareholder of the fourth largest Swedish electricity company, is less relevant for this study. 
Interestingly, the imbalance between takeovers of German firms by French state-owned 
companies and takeovers of French firms by German companies in which the state has a 
stake is also reflected in acquisition patterns of private French and German companies 
[Undisclosed 2006]. Indeed, a higher number of private French enterprises, compared to their 
German competitors, resort to acquisitions when crossing the Rhine. This is to be attributed, 
on the German corporate side, to a more co-operative logic with higher propensity to look for 




The imbalance between French and German state-owned or state-influenced companies 
involved in cross-border linkages is also due to the presence in France of a larger state-
controlled sector than in Germany. This is particularly noticeable among public utilities. The 
1998 liberalisation of the German energy market opened up entry opportunities for foreign 
utilities, which French state-owned operators EDF and GDF were swift to seize (T1-A8, T3-
C5/8), though with mixed long-term success. The geographical proximity of the largest 
energy market in Europe was from an early stage a strong incentive for French public utilities 
to acquire equity investment in Germany. The fact that the French pace of public service 
liberalisation was slower allowed French energy giants, until recently, to remain sheltered 
from competition on their home market whilst expanding on liberalised markets, generating 
per se asymmetrical market distortions. Their expansion strategies have not only been 
conducted through acquisitions, but also through initial capital participations followed by 
gradual consolidation of their shareholding position, as a more discreet way of penetrating 
German local providers weary of their independence. However, neither EDF, nor GDF have 
been able to use their stakes in German utilities as a springboard. Apart from some limited 
success in gaining equity investment in several East German communal energy suppliers, 
GDF has so far not been able to gain a foothold in Germany (T3-C8). Its attempt to acquire 
half of SWL
15
 was turned down by a local referendum rejecting massively the French 
operator, showing hostility on the part of the local German population. Another recent bid by 
GDF to acquire a 26 percent stake in EWE
16
 was beaten by a higher offer from EDF. With 
this operation, EDF provisionally consolidated its position of third energy producer and 
supplier in Germany, largely thanks to having gradually raised its share in the capital of 
EnBW to 45 percent. However, further progression was blocked by EnBW’s other major 
                                                 
15
 Stadtwerke Leizpig 
16
 Energieversorgung Weser-Ems 
 18 
shareholder, the communal company OEW
17
, keen to prevent EDF from seizeing majority 
control, leading in 2010 to EDF’s withdrawal from EnBW (T3-C5). These cases are 
symptomatic for German resistance to the expansion strategies of French groups and lack of 
reciprocity in market access. Reluctance to let state-owned French groups take control of 
German utilities is caused not solely by the perception that French industrial policy pursues 
‘politicised’ aims and is more concerned about strengthening French champions than 
European ones. It also illustrates popular preference for German utilities remaining under 
German control. In addition, whilst capital participations of French state-controlled 
companies in German firms concern essentially public sector investments into utilities, there 
is no example of a state-controlled German firm with participations in the capital of French 
companies, confirming once again a fundamental difference between the two countries in 
terms of direct government intervention.  
 
Moreover, it is significant that French government intervention stretches far beyond the remit 
of state-owned domestic companies. The private corporate sector is also affected, as 
illustrated by the takeover in 2004 of the Franco-German private pharmaceutical company 
Aventis by its (also private) French-based smaller competitor Sanofi-Synthélabo (T1-A11): 
the French political establishment was instrumental in encouraging Sanofi’s hostile bid and 
deterring the Swiss Novartis from acting as the ‘white knight’. Cohen and Pisani-Ferry 
(2005) note that, since the French state had no control of any legal deterrent or financial 
instrument to dictate its will, the sole tool available to influence Novartis or Aventis was to 
use political pressure. The outcome of this highly political takeover suggests, in this instance, 
that this weapon was used very effectively. Interestingly. whilst political manoeuvre allowed 
the home country of Pasteur and Curie to remain present amongst the ‘top ten’ of the 
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pharmaceutical league, the name Hoechst, one of the flagships of post-war German chemical 
giants and main protagonist of the Franco-German Aventis merger in 2000, was wiped out 
from the list of major German pharmaceutical companies, raising strong doubts in Germany 
about the pertinence of developing European champions with a Franco-German foundation.  
 
Furthermore, the list of French state-controlled acquisitions of German businesses is not as 
extensive as might have been expected from German media’s frequent witch-hunting against 
French ‘colbertism’. Whereas acquisitions outside the remit of state control are numerous and 
tend to be the preferred entry mode for most French and German companies investing in the 
neighbouring country (Trouille 2006), state-led acquisitions appear, in comparison, to be 
relatively limited and restricted to a few sectors. The importance and traumatic impact caused 
by the aforementioned Aventis takeover, in which the ’pharmacy of the world’, Germany, 
lost its massive champion, Hoechst, to a foreign predator, should not be underestimated. The 
negative perception created by French state-owned energy companies, taking advantage of 
early liberalisation in German electricity and gas utilities to ‘shop’ in Germany whilst these 
were still protected at home from European competition and foreign takeovers, should not be 
played down either. However, the number of acquisitions taking place between French and 
German private companies is considerably higher than the relatively limited numbers of 
German firms taken over by state-owned French firms. This indicates that a claim, which has 
been frequently referred to in the German press, ’When a German and a French company 
come together, it normally becomes a French company’18 may not be fully justified.  
Suspicions remain, nonetheless, valid when considering state-led acquisitions in activities 
regarded as strategic.  
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EADS, sole substantial merger of French and German companies, deserves attention since it 
has been subject of serious inter-state rivalries (Barmeyer and Mayrhofer 2008). Airbus, in 
particular, which represents nearly two thirds of the company’s turnover, was from the outset 
a joint state-directed attempt to create a ‘merger of equals’ between French and German 
aircraft companies. In sensitive industries like aeronautics, defence and space, where jobs, 
know-how and national interests are at stake, ensuring that a politically constructed merger is 
carried out on ‘equal’ terms was for both French and German political leaders an absolute 
precondition for it to materialise. However, in sectors perceived as strategic, the perfect fit to 
satisfy in every respect this critical political requirement whilst at the same time making full 
sense of a merger in business terms simply does not exist. Companies differ in size, turnover, 
specialisation and technological know-how. Attempting to bind together two firms whilst 
preserving a sensitive ‘national’ balance can pave the ground for managerial tensions and 
shareholder difficulties, as has been the case for EADS since its inception. More than a 
decade after having been launched, EADS remains an artificial construct regularly shaken by 
internal power struggles. The company has two headquarters. France and Germany each 
control 22.36 percent of the company, Paris through SOGEADE
19
, Berlin indirectly through 
Daimler, the main German private shareholder
20
. Issues of control tend to dominate hidden 
agendas on both sides, with Berlin aiming to rebuild its post-war aerospace industry as a 
long-term strategy, and Paris struggling to prevent that the German side gets the upper hand 
in Airbus. Berlin acquired an indirect stake to counterbalance Daimler’s partial withdrawal 
and prevent the Franco-German shareholding balance from shifting in France’s favour. 
Notwithstanding this, EADS remains the most impressive collaborative industrial 
achievement in Europe, but it is faced with a number of deep-rooted challenges, alongside 
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which an unfavourable euro/dollar exchange rate, is only one of many handicaps. It is an 
integrated company in legal, but not in operational terms, which may be too big to fail but 
suffers from a shareholder crisis and needs to overcome tenacious national divisions between 
as well as within plants scattered throughout Europe. From 2008 until 2012, good progress 
was made towards overcoming internal national conflicts. However, in October 2012, a 
proposed tie-up of EADS and Europe’s largest defence group BAE21 which would have 
created a world champion in aeronautics and defence was rejected by the Germany 
government. The decision was dictated by political considerations in a context of 
forthcoming state elections in Bavaria and of fears of possible job losses. These may not have 
been the sole motives for Germany, which was not prepared to reduce its influence in EADS’ 
shareholding at a time when the state-owned development agency KfW
22
 was planning to buy 
out Daimler’s stake. In addition, eight years after the hostile French takeover of Aventis, 
Germany remained too suspicious of French industrial interventionism to reduce its influence 
in EADS.  
 
Let us now examine database information on JVs. Here again, interesting findings can be 
drawn from analysing the collected data. First, we note that, contrary to the numerous 
Franco-German JVs set up in the private sector in the last decades, there is only a limited 
number of JVs involving state-owned companies and in which the German or the French 
state, ot both, have been instrumental. But sectors concerned are as diverse as steel (T2-B1), 
media and culture with the Franco-German cultural TV channel ARTE (T2-B2), aeronautics 
(now part of EADS, T1-A1), gas (T2-B4), rail transportation with co-operations between 




 (T2-B3/5), and nuclear 
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energy co-operation between Areva and Siemens until 2009 (T3-C2). With JVs being the 
second preferred entry mode into the neighbour’s market for French and German private 
companies after acquisitions (Trouille 2006), it is once again surprising to note the low 
number of state-led Franco-German JVs. This is mainly due to the difficulties that the two 
parties experience when it comes to sharing assets, jobs, know-how and control. Looking into 
failed attempts to promote state-led strategic alliances or to prevent M&As between state-
owned French and German firms (T3) will provide further insights.  
 
Second, we note that most co-enterprises listed here are based on equal participations 
between French and German partner companies (where at least one of each partner involved 
is partly state-owned), with the notable exception of nuclear energy co-operation, in which 
Siemens’ share of the Areva NP25 JV with Areva (T3-C2) was limited to 34%, and which 
came to an abrupt end in 2009.  
 
Third, there is no state-led JV with dominant German stake. This, once again, reflects a 
contrast between pro-active, interventionist French stance and German reluctance to interfere 
directly in business affairs. This also reflects the fact that the German political establishment 
does not have the same tools, political tradition and legitimacy as its French counterparts at 
its disposal to interfere with business goals and carry out pro-active industrial policies.  
 
Whist the first two databtables examine different market entry modes of state-led companies, 
the third concerns government failures in attempting to push through Franco-German 
corporate alliances, and political attempts to prevent certain deals. This provides additional 
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insights into the sometimes very activistic role played by states in shaping strategic alliances. 
A number of cases reflect recurrent tensions between politics and markets.  
 





 was emblematic of a jointly decided state-enforced rapprochement (T3-C1) with joint 
subsidiaries and cross-participations. However, the partnership broke up in the wave of 
liberalisation. This case exemplifies strategies of competing telecommunications giants 
corresponding to a business logic geared towards external growth but incompatible with 
political aspirations to create a Franco-German global player. Interestingly, both groups are 
now coming closer together through a co-operation in R&D, a more sensible move when 
considering mounting pressures to innovate in high-technology sectors.  
 
Plans to consolidate Europe’s naval sector by creating a ‘Maritime EADS’ (T3-C6) also 
ended up abruptly due to lack of trust (Becker and Marx 2005). Sector consolidation in the 
sensitive field of defence technology failed due to national concerns not to lose out 
prerogatives, to remain in control and to prioritise national restructuring before considering 
further steps. This desire of EU member-state governments to keep control of national 
defence champions is a major obstacle towards transnational mergers preventing a much 
needed European-wide reorganisation. 
 
The fate of the Paris-based pan-European stock exchange Euronext is also symptomatic for a 
lack of Franco-German ambition resulting in a missed opportunity to unify European stock 
exchanges (T3-C3). Rather than becoming junior partner in a European alliance led by 
Deutsche Börse, Euronext broke up merger negotiations with in 2006 and opted, with French 
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political backing, for a transatlantic solution under the aegis of NYSE
28
, rejecting a 
substantially higher offer from Frankfurt alongside attractive concessions. Interestingly, the 
two most instrumental member states in launching EMU
29
 were unable to overcome divisions 




The Alstom/Siemens case (T3-C7) also deserves attention. French state aid aimed at 
safeguarding a French ‘national jewel’. A rescue deal comprising temporary 31 percent re-
capitalisation negotiated with Brussels aimed at redressing Alstom’s financial situation whilst 
thwarting Siemens’ chances of acquiring the troubled engineering group’s key assets on the 
cheap. This government intervention took place shortly after the Sanofi-Synthélabo’s hostile 
bid on Aventis (T1-A11). The German government’s hopes that an Alstom deal favourable to 
Siemens would counterbalance the Aventis takeover ended in disillusion. 
 
Two other cases discussed earlier, in the nuclear (T3-C2) and energy unility sector (T3-C5) 
came abruptly to an end in 2009 with Siemens’ withdrawal from Areva, and in 2010 with 
EDF’s withdrawal from EnBW, each time because they were prevented from increasing their 
stake. These were the last two of a series of significant corporate alliances, all of which failed 
one after the other, with the notable exception of EADS.  
 
Another illustration of the struggle to launch joint co-operative projects is the railways, a 
domain in which both countries aim to expand within a liberalised European rail market. 
However, competition between SNCF and DB has sharply intensified, although policy 
advisers on both sides have for decades made a compelling business case for merging the two 
state railways to form an Airbus equivalent in rail transportation. Contrary to most other areas 
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there French and German companies are competitors on the same market segments, both 
national operators complement each other, DB with a comparative advantage in freight 
transport, and SNCF in passenger transport. However, deep mistrust, worsened by recent 






More promising fields of co-operation 
 
The last table displays relevant insights into recent attempts to boost R&D projects between 
French and German companies and research centres as a more promising way of encouraging 
industrial actors to co-operate for mutual benefit in terms of scale economies, cost and risk 
sharing, and joint know-how. The Mobilising Programmes for Industrial Innovation of the 
AII
32
 (now part of OSEO
33) launched in France on Beffa’s proposal (2005) were an attempt 
to make up for weaknesses in French research, industrial development and innovation effort 
(Trouille and Uterwedde 2008). The agency’s mission was to initiate and support large-scale 
high-tech industrial projects conceived by a multi-actor partnership of large and small 
business and private and public R&D organisations under a large company’s leadership. Two 
AII-selected projects are Franco-German: NeoVal (T4-D3), which brings together Siemens 
Transportation Systems and Lohr Industrie, and Iseult/Inumac (T4-D4), jointly led by 
Siemens and Guerbet. Such co-operative initiatives make more sense and generate less 
conflictual supranational co-operations. They are, however, not exempt of tensions: the 
Quaero project of an Internet research engine, also put forward by the AII, suffered from 
rivalries between the French and German companies involved and was eventually split into 
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two distinct national projects. This ’fight of dwarves’ questioned the wisdom of trying to 
compete against Google with inadequate financial means.  
 
Galileo (T4-D2) is yet another example of the awkwardness of launching a supranational 
project when it comes to dividing costs and benefits between national firms. This ambitious 
€3.4bn global navigation satellite system, due to be operational by 2013, is currently 
Europe’s most important technological and industrial project. However, even there, France 
and Germany have argued about issues of supremacy, control centres, costs and contracts. 
Germany was eager to ensure it would win a share of procurement contracts proportionate to 
its EU-budget contributions, but feared that most competitive tenders, under EU rules, would 
be allocated to non-German space companies. The project nearly failed until the December 
2007 EU Summit agreed to inject EU public funding to make the project viable, and to divide 
it into six slices with separate calls for tenders and companies only allowed to lead in two 
areas.  
 
Other interesting examples of technological inter-firm co-operations include alliances in the 
automotive industry, between Daimler and Renault Nissan (T4-D6), and between BMW and 
Peugeot, to develop new engines and electric vehicles. Also worth mentioning is the joint 
initiative of the French industrial innovation agency OSEO and KfW to launch EuroQuity in 
2011 (T4-D8), in order to boost bilateral co-operation on high technology projects.  
 
Such recent initiatives indicate that Franco-German industrial co-operation may have drawn 
consequences from past mistakes. It has turned the page of political rivalries that led to the 
failure of most Franco-German champions and is now pursuing a different path, looking for 






Encouraged, or actively pushed forward, by governments, French-German inter-firm linkages 
were presented sometimes as a logical consequence of the special political relationship 
uniting the two countries since five decades, sometimes as the cornerstone of a European-
wide industrial policy. However, mistrust and rivalries have questioned the principle of 
nurturing privileged bilateral industrial partnerships. They indicate that state-influenced 
cross-border industrial co-operations, far from being a ‘natural’ development of French-
German relations, constitute a delicate exercise, especially in key areas of national 
sovereignty, and that, beyond official rhetoric on promoting supranational ‘champions’ with a 
Franco-German setting, France and Germany have remained fundamentally divided by their 
own industrial nationalism. Antagonistic national divisions have plagued corporate alliances. 
They highlight the difficulty to overcome inter-state rivalries despite a background of 
increased economic interdependence, and they question the appropriateness of enforcing co-
operations between firms often competing in similar market segments. In most 
aforementioned cases, the issue of control has proved to be a major concern for French and 
German decision makers. Failed or aborted state-led linkages were caused by obstructive 
state interference. State-sponsored initiatives have been instrumental in launching certain 
large-scale bilateral or multinational alliances which would, otherwise, never have 
materialised under strict market conditions, especially in aircraft, defence and space. But this 
remains limited to sectors where strategic considerations justify public intervention. Even in 
successfully implemented alliances, states frequently act as troublemakers tempted to place 
political choices above business logic at the cost of EU competition and single market rules. 
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States rarely have the business understanding required to identify and pursue trends better 
than market players. The appropriateness of an alliance must be determined by commercial, 
financial and business criteria rather than dictated by political agendas. National obstructions 
are also a major obstacle to the furthering of market integration, as attested by the fact that 
nearly two decades after its inception, the Single Market has only generated very few truly 
European firms. State-sponsored support for R&D projects beyond the national framework is 
nonetheless a promising development, depending on the pertinence of the selected projects 
and subject to state aid being compatible with EU rules.  
 
Against this background, this empirical analysis of French and German patterns of public 
intervention into the expansion strategies of home companies has revealed substantial 
differences in the way France and Germany organise their own government-industry 
relations. This reflects a long-standing cultural divide between Berlin and Paris about state 
interventionism, traditionally reflected in different traditions corresponding to two VoCs 
similar in their conception of the social market economy, but dissimilar in terms of the role 
played by the state in the national economy. This discrepancy is particularly apparent in two 
distinct conceptions of industrial policy. On one side, certain home companies are protected 
against foreign investors, while on the other it is claimed that markets are more open to 
investors and averse to political intervention. However, this picture no longer fully 
corresponds to reality. Despite clear resurgence of state interventionism during Sarkozy’s 
presidency, French state-directed capitalism has undergone considerable change under the 
combined pressures of European integration and globalisation. The state has retreated 
significantly from its traditional role, and France has a more ‘liberal’ economy than is 
generally perceived (Trouille and Uterwedde 2008). Traditional French industrial policy 
model based on rigid, state-led, centralist top-down model of industrial development was only 
 29 
possible as long as businesses, funding and public orders were all under state control. With 
economic liberalisation and EU regulation, this is no longer possible, even though old, 
ingrained interventionist habits die hard. In contrast, Germany has traditionally been a fervent 
proponent of market openness and corporate autonomy, showing strong reluctance towards 
direct political intervention to preserve ‘national’ interests. In practice, however, more subtle 
forms of industrial policy are exercised at regional and local level, as illustrated by local 
opposition to French energy companies. In addition, until recently historic bonds between 
banking and industry were protecting German companies against foreign takeovers. The 
shock caused in 2002 by Vodafone’s takeover of Mannesmann, followed by a debate on 
sovereign wealth funds revealed increasing sensitivity in German public opinion about the 
risk of losing control on national assets. Respective French and German attitudes towards 
industrial policy, therefore, are less contradictory than would appear at first glance. French 
discourse on economic patriotism is more a matter of rhetoric, whose function is to reassure 
an electorate lacking confidence in the benefits of economic globalisation, rather than an 
established protectionist policy in its own right. Conversely, Germany’s rhetoric on free 
markets often conceals more or less hidden interventionist practices. Despite apparently 
opposed, historically grounded attitudes towards the role of the state in government-industry 
relations and, more generally, in the economy, the two main protagonists of a ‘continental’ 
European capitalism are not as fundamentally different as is generally assumed.  
 
This research and its classification of inter-firm linkages have allowed us to test this paper’s 
initial assumption that a declared willingness to co-operate, however strong the determination 
may claim to be, is not sufficient to resolve deeply-rooted differences in conceptions of the 
role of the state and in the interpretation of what industrial policy entails. A joint ambition 
can only be fulfilled if it is backed up by a clear consensus on joint industrial policy aims, 
 30 
which supposes shared efforts to resist the sirens of industrial nationalism. Only by 
transcending their industrial nationalism and, arguably, by Europeanising the notion of 
economic patriotism, will France, Germany and other EU member states be able to launch the 
kind of ambitious large-scale cross-national industrial projects that the EU needs to 
consolidate its position in the knowledge economy and remain a key actor in the wave of 
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Table 1: M&A activity involving French and German firms with direct of indirect state 
intervention 
N.B.:  In takeovers the dominant partner is underlined. In the case of a merger of equals no company name is 
underlined.  
Source: Compiled by author 








































Launch of Economic Interest Group Airbus 
Industries. 
Launch of Eurocopter. 
Creation of EMS (European Missile Systems) and 
EMI (European Satellite Industry). 
Announcement of EADS merger (July 2000). All 
existing co-operative projects (Eurocopter, 
Airbus, Ariane…) are integrated into EADS. 
ThyssenKrupp (60%) and EADS (40%) purchase 
sonar specialist Atlas Elektronik. Germany 
invoked national security grounds to decline 
substantially higher offer by Thales (France). 
A proposed merger between EADS and BAE is 
turned down by the German government. 
A2 1991 Elf Aquitaine  
(privatized in 1994) 
Treuhandanstalt (German 
government agency (1990-94) 
responsible for privatizing East 
German combinates) 
Major investment negotiated at highest state level: 
construction of Leuna oil refinery. In return, Elf 






Crédit Lyonnais Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft 
(BfG) 
Crédit Lyonnais (nationalized in 1945, privatized 
in 1999) purchases this major retail bank and 
becomes first foreign bank to enter Germany. 




UAP (Union des Assurances 
de Paris, state-owned in 1993) 
Colonia Nordstern Colonia Nordstern becomes part of UAP, 














Scetauroute SA  























Both firms merge their European consultancy 
engineering activities. 
Egis, engineering subsidiary of Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations (CGC), acquires 
Dorsch Consult.  
Egis acquires 80% of Airplan (Stuttgart) through 
Dorsch Consult. 
Egis acquires 100% of wmp Projektmanagement 
(Stuttgart) through Dorsch Consult. 
Egis sells all wmp Projektmanagement shares to 
Dornier Consulting. 
Egis sells loss making Dorsch Consult to 
Hoffmann Röder.  
A6 01.1999 Usinor (now part of Arcelor-
Mittal) 
Eko-Hüttenwerk Usinor acquires Belgian steel producer Cockerill-
Sambre and its East German subsidiary Eko 
Stahlwerk. 
A7 12.2000 La Poste Deutscher Paketdienst (DPD) Government-owned, yet independently operated 
French postal service La Poste takes over the 
DPD European network by controlling 84.8% of 
voting rights and becomes second-largest parcel 
operator in Germany. 
A8 12.2002 Gaz de France (GDF) Preussag Energie TUI concentrates activities on tourism and sells 
its Energy subsidiary to GDF. 
A9 03.2003 Louis Dreyfus 
Communications SA 




German operator DT sells deficit-making French 
subsidiary Siris, specialized in landline 
connections and services to business, to French 
telecoms operator LDCom. 
A10 08.2003 Graninge (EDF) Eon EDF sells its 36.4% of fourth-largest Swedish 







Sanofi-Synthélabo takes over pharmaceutical 
company Aventis with active French 
governmental support and becomes Sanofi-
Aventis.  
A12 12.2004 Koba Deutsche Post DP acquires a majority share of Koba, leading 
specialist in France for direct marketing and mail 
solutions. 
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A13 02.2005 T-Online (Lagardère group) Deutsche Telekom DT (in which the German government still held 
15.7% and another 14% through its KfW bank) 
increases gradually its stake in T-Online since 
2000. In 2005 Lagardère sells its remaining shares 
and DT takes majority control.  
A14 09.2007 Areva Multibrid After an unsuccessful bid against Suzlon (India) 
to acquire wind power group REPower, of which 
it holds 30%, Areva (nuclear sector) purchases 
51% of offshore wind turbine developer 




Table 2: State-led joint ventures (JV) between French and German firms  
N.B.:  When there is equal participation no company name is underlined. The name of the French company is 
underlined if there is a dominant French stake.  
Source: Compiled by author 
Classification Date French partner German partner Sector/Outcome  
B1 1991 Usinor-Sacilor Mannesmann French state-owned steelmaker and German steel 
giant merge tubing activities and launch a JV for 
large-diameter pipe production, Europipe (now 
owned by Dillinger Hüttenwerke and Salzgitter 
Mannesmann). 
B2 05.1991 La Sept TV Channel ARD/ZDF Mitterrand and Kohl launch Franco-German 
cultural channel  ARTE (Association Relative à 
la Télévision Européenne).  
B3 06.1996 SNCF NMBS/SNCB (Belgium), 
joined later by DB and 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen 
(NS) 
SNCF and NMBS/SNCB launch international 
high-speed train operatorThalys and are 
subsequently joined by DB and NS.  (SNCF: 
62%, DB: 10%, NMBS/SNCB: 28%). Thalys 
operates Paris-Cologne services via Brussels.  
 
B4 03.2002 Gaz de France (GDF) Ruhrgas GDF, Ruhrgas and Gasprom (Russia) purchase 






   
05.2007 
SNCF DB The state-owned railway operators launch 
Rhealys, a 50/50 JV with headquarters in 
Sarrebruck, to exploit high-speed trains on Paris-
Francfort and Paris-Stuttgart-Munich lines from 
2007 onwards. 
To replace Rhealys, SNCF and DB launch Alleo 
(Alliance Est-Ouest), a joint consortium based in 
Sarrebruck, to operate high-speed tracks on the 
new TGV Est (Paris-Frankfurt) line (using 
German ICE train sets) and Paris-




Table 3: Failed attempts to initiate state-led strategic alliances and/or measures to 
prevent M&As between French and German firms with a state participation 
Source: Compiled by author 











































The two state-owned operators launch joint 
subsidiary Eucom.  
Launch of second subsidiary, Eunetcom. 
Launch of Atlas. 
Alliance with US company Sprint: FT and DT 
buy 10% each in Sprint. 
Launch of Global One (international services of 
business). FT and DT buy 25% each.  
FT, DT and Energis (GB) launch a JV, 
MetroHoldings, to expand on the British market. 
Energis owns 50%, FT and DT 25% each. 
FT and DT exchange cross-participations (1.8% 
each). 
The FT/DT alliance ends up abruptly after DT’s 
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T-Mobile UK (DT) 
attempted merger with Telecom Italia.  
FT acquires 17.24% of Germany’s No3 in mobile 
phone sector.  
KPN and Bell South win a bid on E-Plus.  
After losing E-Plus, MobilCom becomes FT’s 
partner by default but this proves to be a high-risk 
investment.  
After losing €11bn, FT sells most of its 28.3% 
share of MobilCom and withdraws from the 
German market, whilst DT consolidates its 
position on the French market through its 
subsidiary T-Online. 
FT, DT and Telefonica sign co-operation 
agreement to allow their customers access to their 
mobile networks.  
FT and DT announce intention to co-operate in 
developing joint R&D projects. 
























Cooperation agreement in nuclear sector. 
Framatome ANP (Advanced Nuclear Power) is 
launched to develop the EPR reactor. 
Framatome ANP is renamed Areva NP. 
The French government unveils various scenarios 
towards restructuring the nuclear sector. Sarkozy 
expresses reservations about future Franco-
German nuclear co-operation. 









   2006 
 
 02.2007 




Euronext (consists of Paris, 
Amsterdam, Brussels and 
Lisbon stock exchanges and of 








Negotiations between Paris, Frankfurt, 
Amsterdam, Milan and Zürich towards 
establishing an integrated European stock 
exchange do not materialize. 
Negotiations towards grouping together European 
stock exchanges continue between Euronext, 
Deutsche Börse and London stock Exchange.  
 
Deutsche Börse bids for Euronext, which 
considers a transatlantic alliance with NYSE. 
Euronext merges with NYSE. 
C4 09.2000 Tractebel (energy division of 
Suez) 
E.on  This attempted merger in the energy sector fails 






















EDF   Energie Baden-











EDF acquires 25.1% of Germany’s third largest 
utility. EDF gradually increases its shareholding.  
EDF holds joint control of EnBW with OEW  
(45.01% each). 
EDF uses EnBW subsidiary to increase its 
portfolio of German regional and local suppliers: 
Ostalbkreis; Weinsberg, a 50/50 JV with EnBW 
of RKI (Rheinkraftwerk Iffezheim) and CERGA 
(Centrale Electrique Rhénane de Gangsheim); 
50.1% shareholding in ZEAG (Zementwerk 
Leuffen - Elektrizitätswerk Heilbronn); 76% of 
Swiss power supplier Kraftwerke Lauenburg 
operating in South Western Germany; 15% of 
MVV Energie (Mannheimer Versorgungs- und 
Verkehrsgesellschaft); 55% of SWD (Stadtwerke 
Düsseldorf).  
EDF acquires 26% of Germany’s fifth-largest 
energy company EWE via EnBW and 
consolidates its third position on the German 
energy market.  










Werft (HDW)  
 
Atlas Elektronik 
Thales fails in attempting to take over submarine 
builder HDW. The two governments disagree on a 
Franco-German re-structuring of shipyards. 
 Despite making the best offer, Thales is 
prevented from purchasing Atlas Elektronik, 
subsidiary of BAE Systems (GB) on national 
security grounds. Atlas is finally taken over by 
Thyssenkrupp and EADS; Thales blames political 
pressures. At the same time, French plans to 
consolidate the domestic naval sector by bringing 
together state-owned DCN and Thales is seen as a 
threat to Thyssenkrupp’s marine division.  
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C7 06.2004 
   
Alstom Siemens The French government re-capitalises Alstom and 
prevents Siemens from acquiring its profitable 
activities.   
C8 02.2008 
   
Gaz de France (GDF) Gasag (Berliner Gaswerke) 
 
Verbundnetzgas (VNG) 
Erdgas Mark      
Brandenburg (EBM) 
 
SWL (Stadtwerke Leipzig) 
GDF acquires:  
-31.6% of Berlin gas utility Gasag and shares 
control with Bewag; 
- Shares of East German utilities VNG (5%) and  
EBM (25.5%). 
 
In a referendum organized on 27.1.08 the Leipzig 
population overwhelmingly rejects GDF’s offer to 




Table 4: Major state-led joint R&D projects involving French and German firms, research institutions 
and laboratories 









Details: funding bodies, type of framework 
(cooperative/competitive) 
 





EDF University of 
Karlsruhe 
EDF co-finances research project to develop clean energy 
technologies for sustainable development in cities and territories, 













The private consortium responsible for launching Galileo attempts 
to bring together the main European space companies alongside 
EADS: Thales and Alcatel (Fr.), TeleOp (Gy.), Finnmeccanica (It.), 
Aena and Hispasat (Sp.) and Inmarsat (GB). It is decided to set up 
Galileo’s headquarters in Toulouse and its control centre in 
Oberpfaffenhofen (Munich).  
The consortium fails to reach agreement and withdraws from the 
project. To overcome deadlock the EU Commission offers 
European budget financing and redrafts tendering rules to ensure 
fair distribution across national space companies. 
 
D3 04.2006 NeoVal Lohr Siemens-France 
(industrial project 
leader) 
NeoVal (modular automatic transport systems) is one of five initial 
programmes launched by AII (now part of Oseo). AII provides 
€26m subsidies for 6-years with €60m investment. Approved by 
EU Commission. 
 



















Bruker BioSpin  
Schering 
Iseult/Inumac (imaging of neuro-diseases) is a programme for 
industrial innovation selected by the AII’s supervisory board. AII 
provides €55m subsidies for 5-8-years with €200m investment.  
 







Quaero (automatic processing of digital multimedia content) is one 
of five initial programmes launched by AII. The R&D programme 
will represent a total cost of €199m, including €99m of financial 
aid from France approved by the EU. First launched as a Franco-
German programme; however due to divergences two distinct 
national programmes were launched, Quaero (France) and Theseus 
(Germany). Quaero, which still counts German research 
organizations, retains a bi-national dimension. 
 
D6 04.2010 Car alliance Renault Nissan Daimler The companies exchange stakes to launch a long-term partnership 
to build small cars, engines and vans together. 
 
D7 12.2010 Strategic 
partnership  
Atos Origin Siemens Siemens takes a 15% stake and a board seat in IT services group 
Atos Origin to create Europe’s second-largest IT outsourcing 
company behind IBM. The deal includes a strategic partnership 
with joint investment into software R&D projects.  
 





OSEO KFW OSEO (French innovation agency providing financial support to 
French SMEs) and KFW (German development bank owned by the 
government (80%) and the Länder (20%)) launch EuroQuity.  
 
 37 
 
